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Abstract
Financial innovation in an existing asset generically supports a Pareto improvement, targeting the
income eﬀect.
This result, as several on taxation, owes to one unifying notion: that an intervention generically
supports Pareto improvements if the implied price adjustment is suﬃciently sensitive to the economy’s
risk aversion.
Elul (1995) and Cass and Citanna (1998) introduce ﬁnancial innovation in a new unwanted asset,
targeting the substitution eﬀect.
Our result requires an initial position of greater asset completeness, but not the addition of a new
asset market.
The existence argument relies on recent developments in demand theory with incomplete markets.
∗I wish to thank Professors Donald Brown, John Geanakoplos, and Stephen Morris for their feedback and support, the Cowles
Foundation for a Carl A. Anderson fellowship, and the participants in the 12th European Workshop on General Equilibrium
Theory, on May 31, 2003. All shortcomings are mine.
01I n t r o d u c t i o n
When asset markets are incomplete, there are almost always many Pareto improving policy interventions,
if there are multiple commodities and households. When they are complete, the First Welfare Theorem
implies there never exist any. While the Pareto improvements vanish with the completion of asset markets,
the process of completion itself can be Pareto worsening, as shown by Hart (1975) in an example and by
Elul (1995) and Cass and Citanna (1998) generically.
Focusing on ﬁnancial innovation policy, we create a framework for proving the existence of Pareto im-
proving ﬁnancial innovations, for computing them, and for estimating the size of the improvements. We
apply the framework to prove the existence of Pareto improving ﬁnancial innovations targeting the income
eﬀect. In contrast, Cass and Citanna’s, and Elul’s ﬁnancial innovation policies target the substitution eﬀect.
Our result requires an initial position of greater asset completeness than theirs, but not the ad
dition of a new asset market.
The protagonist in Pareto improvements is the price adjustment following an intervention. Its role is
to improve on asset insurance by redistributing endowment wealth across states, as anticipated by Stiglitz
(1982). The price adjustment is determined by how innovations and prices aﬀect aggregate, not individual,
demand.
If ﬁnancial innovation targeting current incomes is Pareto improving, then it must cause an equilibrium
price adjustment, Grossman (1975). Conversely, we prove that if the price adjustment is suﬃciently sensitive
to risk aversion, then for almost all risk aversions and endowments, Pareto improving ﬁnancial innovations
exist. We show how to verify this sensitivity test with standard demand theory, which Turner (2003a)
extends from complete to incomplete markets.
Financial innovation policy targeting only the income eﬀect generically supports a Pareto improvement,
b e c a u s ei tp a s s e st h i ss e n s i t i v i t yt e s t .
To numerically identify the Pareto improving ﬁnancial innovations, we give a formula for the welfare
impact of ﬁnancial innovations. It requires information on the individual marginal utilities and net trades,
and on the derivative of aggregate, but not individual, demand with respect to innovations and prices.
T ob o u n dt h er a t eo fP a r e t oi m p r o v e m e n t ,w ed e ﬁne an equilibrium’s insurance deﬁcit. Pareto optimality
obtains exactly when the insurance deﬁcit is zero. If the ﬁnancial innovation policy targets only current
incomes, then the implied price adjustment determines the best rate, by integration against the covariance
of insurance deﬁcit and net trades across agents. The equilibrium’s insurance deﬁcit arises from the agents’
component of marginal utility for contingent income standing orthogonally to the asset span.
Geanakoplos and Polemarchakis (1986) began the study of generic improvements with incomplete mar-
kets, and introduced the idea of quadratically perturbing commodity demands. Since they allowed the central
planner to decide the agents’ asset demands, they did not need to go beyond perturbing commodity demand.
To show why weaker interventions may improve welfare, such as anonymous taxes and ﬁnancial innovations,
it became necessary to take into account how adjustments in agents’ asset demands caused a further price
adjustment. Naturally, this required perturbing asset demand as well as commodity demand. Missing was an
extension, quadratically perturbing both commodity and asset demands. This lacuna blocked contributions
1f o ro v e rt e ny e a r s 1, until a breakthrough by Citanna, Kajii, and Villanacci (1998), who analyzed ﬁrst order
conditions instead of Slutsky matrices. Researchers have extended the theory of generic improvements with
incomplete markets to many policies by applying this ﬁrst order approach; on ﬁnancial innovation, Cass and
Citanna (1998), and on taxes, Citanna, Polemarchakis, and Tirelli (2001), Bisin et al. (2001), and Mandler
(2003). Recently, Turner (2003a) has supplied the missing extension, and Turner (2004a) used it to unify
and extend the literature on Pareto improving taxation, marking a return to the original demand-based
approach to generic improvements from the latest ﬁrst order-based approach.
Our existence result here on ﬁnancial innovation is based on this recent extension of demand theory with
incomplete markets. We believe in the computational and expositional advantages of the original demand-
based approach to generic improvements. First, an argument about generic welfare can drastically reduce
the number of equations, targeting the envelope formula instead of the ﬁrst order conditions and budget
identities generating it. First order conditions and budget identities completely vanish; perturbations are
to the objects in the envelope formula. Second, to compute the welfare impact of interventions, the policy
maker needs to know the derivative of aggregate, not individual, demand. In the ﬁrst order approach, he
needs to know the derivative of every individual’s demand, i.e. the second derivative of every individual’s
utility. Third, the economist can express intuitions with the familiar language of demand theory, and avoid
the less familiar language of submersions.
We continue as follows. Section 2 presents a model of ﬁnancial innovation policy. Section 3 has the
formula for the welfare impact of ﬁnancial innovations. Section 4 obtains the generic existence of Pareto
improving ﬁnancial innovations from the sensitivity condition on price adjustment, which it then reinterprets
in terms of the Reaction of Demand to Prices and to Policy. Section 5 summarizes the demand theory in
incomplete markets necessary to apply the sensitivity test, then section 6 applies it to ﬁnancial innovations
targeting the income eﬀect. Section 7 estimates the rate of Pareto improvement. Section 8 derives the welfare
impact formula, and spells out the notation and the parameterization of economies.
2G E I m o d e l
Households h =1 ,...,H know the present state of nature, denoted 0, but are uncertain as to which among
s =1 ,...,S nature will reveal in period 1. They consume commodities c =1 ,...,C in the present and
future, and invest in assets j =1 ,...,J in the present only. Each state has commodity C as unit of
account, in terms of which all value is quoted. Markets assign to household h an income wh ∈ R
S+1
++ ,t o
commodity c<C ap r i c e p·c ∈ R
S+1
++ ,t oa s s e t j ap r i c e qj ∈ R and future yield aj ∈ RS.W ec a l l
(p·c)C
1 = p =( ps·) the spot prices, q =( qj) the asset prices, (aj)=a =( as) the asset structure, and
w =( wh) the income distribution, P ≡ R
(C−1)(S+1)
++ × RJ.2 The set of budget variables is
b ≡ (P,a,w) ∈ B ≡ P × RJ×S × R
(S+1)H
++
and has some distinguished nonempty relatively open subset B0 ⊂ B.
1The sole one is Elul (1995).
2The numeraire convention is that unity is the price of sC,s ≥ 0, which for this reason is omitted from the description of
P. The addition of the sC,s ≥ 0 coordinates, bearing value unity, is denoted p. We use the notation P =( p,q) ∈ P.
2Demand for commodities and assets d =( x,y):B0 → R
C(S+1)
++ ×RJ is a function on B0. The demand
dh =( xh,yh) of household h depends on own income only, (xh,yh)(P,a,w,t)=( xh,yh)(P,a,w0,t) if
wh = w0h.
An economy (a,e,d) consists of an asset structure a, endowments e, and demands d.F o r e a c h
household h, endowments specify a certain number eh
sc > 0 of each commodity c in each state s,a n d
demands specify a demand dh. Let Ω be the set of (a,e,d).3









We say (a,e) ∈ Ω has equilibrium P ∈ P. Under neoclassical assumptions (a,e) ∈ Ω has an equilibrium4.
2.1 Neoclassical demand
Consider the budget function β











Demand dh =( xh,yh) is neoclassical if there is a utility function u : R
C(S+1)
+ → R with
u(xh(b)) = max
Xh(b)
u throughout B0 Xh(b) ≡ {x ∈ R
C(S+1)
+ | β
h(b,x,y)=0 , some y ∈ RJ}
Neoclassical welfare is v : B0 → RH,v(b)=( vh(b)) ≡ (uh(xh(b))). The neoclassical domain is
B0 = {(P,a,w) ∈ B | q ∈ aRS
++,a has linearly independent rows}
Debreu’s smooth preferences imply neoclassical demand exists and is smooth.
The interpretation of X is that the cost of consumption x in excess of income w is ﬁnanced by some
portfolio y ∈ RJ of assets. A portfolio speciﬁes how much of each asset to buy or sell (yj ≷ 0), and aj
s
how much value in state s an asset j buyer is to collect, a seller to deliver.
3W e l f a r e i m p a c t o f ﬁnancial innovation
Financial innovation in an asset structure a is a smooth path t = t(ξ) in RJ×S through t(0) = 0,
deﬁning a(ξ)=a + t(ξ) as a new asset structure. We think of inﬁnitesimal ﬁnancial innovation as its
initial velocity ˙ t = ˙ t(0). Suppose the GEI (P,a,e) is regular in that equilibrium prices are locally a smooth
function of the economy, so that ﬁnancial innovation lifts locally to a unique path (P(ξ),a+ t(ξ),e) of
nearby GEI. Then welfare is v(b(ξ)) with b(ξ)=( P(ξ),a+t(ξ),(wh
s = eh0
s ps(ξ))h
s). Thus ﬁnancial innovation
impacts welfare only via the budget variables it implies. By the fundamental theorem of calculus the welfare
3The appendix spells out the parameterization of demand d.
4Geanakoplos and Polemarchakis (1986).
3impact is the integral of Dbvh · ˙ b, which by abuse we call the welfare impact. We compute this product in
the appendix, using the envelope theorem for Dbvh and the chain rule for ˙ b, where details of the notation
appear.
Proposition 1 (Envelope) The welfare impact ˙ v ∈ RH of inﬁnitesimal innovation ˙ t at a regular GEI
is





Here (λ)0 collects the households’ marginal utilities of income across states, and ˙ m the impact on their
incomes, private and public. The private one is the impact y1˙ a on portfolio payoﬀs, and the public one is
t h ei m p a c to nt h ev a l u eo ft h e i re x c e s sd e m a n d s z in all nonnumeraire markets, that implied by the impact
˙ P on prices.
Policy targeting welfare must account for the equilibrium price adjustment it causes.
At a regular GEI there is a price adjustment matrix dP, smooth in a neighborhood of it, such that
˙ P = dP ˙ t. Thus the welfare impact is a diﬀerential ˙ t → ˙ v,
dv =( λ)0 (y1 − zdP) (1)
Note dv = dv(b) is a function of the budget variables, since v itself is.
We consider two types of ﬁnancial policy, perturbing an existing asset in a substitution-free way, and
perturbing a new unwanted asset, as in Elul (1995) and Cass and Citanna (1998). Aggregate demand is
provoked by the income eﬀect of one policy, and by the substitution eﬀect of the other. In either case,
ﬁnancial innovation is parameterized by a vector subspace ˙ t ∈ T = T(b) associated with the equilibrium
budget variables b :
dv : T(b) → RH
4 Framework for generic existence of Pareto improving innovation
We prove the generic existence of Pareto improving innovations, stressing the role of changing commodity
prices over the role of the particular ﬁnancial policy. Existence follows directly from a hypothesis on price
adjustment. Thus the ﬁnancial policy is relevant only insofar as it meets the hypothesis on price adjustment.
Then we reinterpret this hypothesis on dP in terms of primitives, the Reaction of Demand to Prices and
the Reaction of Demand to Policy.
Pareto improving ﬁnancial innovation exists if there exists a solution to dv˙ t À 0.I nt u r nt h i se x i s t si f
dv ∈ RH×dimT(b) has rank H, which in turn forces us to suppose the innovation parameters outnumber
household types dimT(b) ≥ H. The key idea is that if dv =( λ)0y1 − (λ)0zdP is rank deﬁcient, then a
perturbation of the economy would restore full rank by preserving the ﬁrst summand but aﬀecting the second
one. Namely, if some economy’s dP is not appropriate, then almost every nearby economy’s dP is.
We have in mind a perturbation of the households’ risk aversion (D2uh)h,w h i c ha ﬀects nothing but
dP in the welfare impact dv. Now, to restore the rank the risk aversion must map into (λ)0zdP richly
4enough. Since this map keeps (λ)0z ﬁxed, we require that (λ)0z have rank H and that dP be suﬃciently
sensitive to risk aversion. Cass and Citanna (1998) gift us the ﬁrst requirement:
Fact 1 (Full Externality of Price Adjustment on Welfare) Suppose asset incompleteness exceeds house-






Fact 2 At a regular active GEI, dP is locally a smooth function of risk aversion; the marginal utilities λ
i
and excess demands zi are locally constant in risk aversion.
For k ∈ R(S+1)(C−1)+J we say that a commodity coordinate is one of the ﬁrst (S +1 ) ( C − 1).
Deﬁnition 1 At a regular active GEI, dP is k-Sensitive to risk aversion if for every α ∈ Rdim(T)
there is a path of risk aversion that solves k0d ˙ P = α0.5 It is Sensitive to risk aversion if it is k-Sensitive
to risk aversion for all k with a nonzero commodity coordinate.
Assumption 1 (Generic Sensitivity of dP) If H>1, then generically in endowments and utilities, at
every GEI dP is Sensitive to risk aversion.
This assumption banishes the particulars of the ﬁnancial innovation policy, leaving only its imprint on
dP. Of course, dP is deﬁned only at regular GEI, so implicitly assumed is that regular GEI are generic in
endowments. Lastly, the requirement dimT(b) ≥ H with b arising in equilibrium makes sense only with
Assumption 2 (Innovation has a dimension) If S − J ≥ H, then there is an integer dim such that
generically in utilities, at every GEI the vector subspace ˙ t ∈ T = T(b) parameterizing ﬁnancial innovation
has dimension dim. Call it gendim.
Theorem 2 (Logic of Pareto Improvement) Fix a ﬁnancial policy and the desired welfare impact ˙ v ∈
RH. Grant the Generic Sensitivity of dP under gendim,S− J ≥ H>1,C > 1. Then generically in
utilities and endowments, at every GEI ˙ v is the welfare impact of some ˙ t ∈ T.H e n c eﬁnancial innovation
supports a nearby Pareto superior GEI.




nonnumeraire excess demand equations
γ0(λ)0 (y1 − zdP)=0
γ0γ − 1=0
where dv : T(b) → RH. Suppose endowments and utilities make this transverse to zero and the natural pro-
jection is proper. By the transversality theorem, for generic such, the system of (dimp+dimq)+gendim+1
equations is transverse to zero in the remaining endogenous variables, which number dimp +d i mq +di mγ.
By hypothesis gendim ≥ H =d i mγ, so for these endowments and utilities the preimage theorem implies
that no endogenous variables solve this system—every GEI has dv with rank H.
5The appendix spells out a path of risk aversion. Here the dot denotes diﬀerentiation with respect to the path’s parameter.
5This is transverse to zero. As is well known, we can control the ﬁrst equations by perturbing one
household’s endowment. For a moment, say that we can control the second equations and preserve the top
ones. We then control the third equation and preserve the top two, by scalar multiples of γ. So transversality
obtains if our momentary supposition on γ0dv holds:








since λ,z (hence y1) are locally constant by fact 2. We want to make α arbitrary, and we can if dP is
k-sensitive, which holds by assumption if k has a nonzero commodity coordinate. It has: Full Externality
of Price Adjustment on Welfare, C>1,γ 6=0 imply γ0(λ)0z is nonzero in the coordinate m = s1 for
some s ≤ H − 1.
That the natural projection is proper we omit. (The numeraire asset structure is ﬁxed.)
Insofar as generically supporting a Pareto improvement, a ﬁnancial policy need only imply a sensitive
price adjustment, and its particulars are irrelevant.
4.1 Expression for Price Adjustment
Before we can check whether a particular policy meets the Sensitivity of dP to Risk Aversion, we need
an expression for dP. We express dP in terms of the Reaction of Demand to Prices and the Reaction of
Demand to Policy.
Let an underbar connote the omission of the numeraire in each state, deﬁne
d : B0 → R
(C−1)(S+1)
++ × RJ d = Σd
h










∇≡Dp,qda,e the R e a c t i o no fD e m a n dt oP r i c e s
∆ ≡ Dada,e the Reaction of Demand to Policy
(2)
Suppose a path of GEI (p(ξ),q(ξ),a+ t(ξ),(wh
s = eh0
s ps(ξ))h






is an identity in the path’s parameter ξ.D i ﬀerentiating with respect to it,
∇ ˙ P + ∆˙ t =0
AG E Ii sregular if ∇ is invertible. By the implicit function theorem, at a regular GEI equilibrium prices
P are locally a smooth function of the ﬁnancial innovation t(ξ).
6Pa,e is open, as the preimage by a continuous function of the open B0. Recall the notation P0 =( p0,q0).




where the Reactions ∇,∆ are deﬁned in (2).
4.2 Primitives for the Sensitivity of Price Adjustment to Risk Aversion
Given the Logic of Pareto improvement, we want to check whether a policy meets the Generic Sensitivity of
dP. We provide primitives for the Sensitivity of dP,t h a n k st oe x p r e s s i o n( dP)7:
d ˙ P = −∇
−1 ˙ ∆ + ∇
−1 ˙ ∇∇
−1∆
Recall equation k0d ˙ P = α0 from deﬁnition 1. If ˙ ∆ =0 and ˜ k0 ≡def k0∇
−1 then the equation reads
˜ k0 ˙ ∇∇
−1∆ = α0. If ∆ has rank gendim then there is a solution β to β
0∇
−1∆ = α0 so it suﬃces to solve
˜ k0 ˙ ∇ = β
0. Thus dP is k-Sensitive if (1) ∆ has rank gendim,( 2 ) ˜ k is nonzero everywhere, (3) whenever ˜ K
is nonzero everywhere and β ∈ R(S+1)(C−1)+J, there is a path of risk aversion that solves ˙ ∆ =0 , ˜ K0 ˙ ∇ = β
0.
(Take ˜ k = ˜ K.) Thus Generic Sensitivity of dP obtains (independently of the ˜ k deﬁned) if:
Lemma 1 (Activity) If H>1, generically in endowments every GEI is regular.8
Assumption 3 (Full Reaction of Demand to Policy) If C>1, generically in utilities and endow-
ments, at every GEI ∆ has rank gendim.
Lemma 2 (Mean Externality of Price Adjustment on Welfare is Regular) Generically in utilities,
at every regular GEI, whenever k is nonzero in some commodity coordinate, ˜ k0 ≡ k0∇
−1 is nonzero every-
where.
Assumption 4 (Suﬃcient Independence of Reactions) If H>1, then generically in endowments
and utilities, whenever ˜ k ∈ R(S+1)(C−1)+J is nonzero everywhere and β ∈ R(S+1)(C−1)+J,a te v e r yG E I
there is a path of risk aversion that solves ˙ ∆ =0 ,˜ k0 ˙ ∇ = β
0.
These primitives for the Generic Sensitivity of dP and the Logic of Pareto Improvement yield
Theorem 4 (Test for Pareto Improvement) Fix a ﬁnancial policy and the desired welfare impact ˙ v ∈
RH. Say the policy passes the Full Reaction of Demand to Policy and the Suﬃcient Independence of Reactions
under gendim,S− J ≥ H>1,C >1. Then generically in utilities and endowments, at every GEI ˙ v is
the welfare impact of some ˙ t ∈ T.H e n c eﬁnancial innovation supports a nearby Pareto superior GEI.
Next we illustrate how to check whether a ﬁnancial policy passes this test via demand theory in incomplete
markets, as developed by Turner (2003a). We show that substitution free ﬁnancial innovation passes this test,
and so generically supports Pareto improvement, owing to the unifying logic of a sensitive price adjustment.
In contrast, ﬁnancial innovation in a new unwanted asset never passes this test. At a GEI ∇ will turn out
to be independent of the policy, so we will verify the lemma on the Mean for one and all policies.
7Applying the chain rule to JJ−1 = I gives d
dξJ−1 = −J−1( d
dξJ)J−1.
8We do not argue this standard result. For these endowments, both ∆ and dP are deﬁned.
75 Summary of demand theory in incomplete markets
We must check whether each policy meets the Full Reaction of Demand to Policy and the Suﬃcient Indepen-
dence of Reactions. For this we report the theory of demand in incomplete markets as developed by Turner
(2003a). The basic idea is to use decompositions of ∆,∇ in terms of Slutsky matrices, and then to per-
turb these Slutsky matrices by perturbing risk aversion, while preserving neoclassical demand at the budget
variables under consideration. We stress that this theory is applied to, but independent of, equilibrium.
5.1 Slutsky perturbations




























In showing the diﬀerentiability of demand, the key step is the invertibility of H(D2u). Slutsky matrices






where S,c are symmetric of dimensions C∗ +J,S +1 and m =( mx,m y) is C∗ +J ×S +1.9 A Slutsky
perturbation is of the form ∇ = H(D)−1−H(D2u)−1, for some symmetric D ≈ D2u that is close enough
for the inverse to exist. A Slutsky perturbation is a perturbation of Slutsky matrices rationalizable by some
perturbation of the Hessian of utility. Being symmetric, we write
∇ =
"
˙ S − ˙ m
− ˙ m0 −˙ c
#
and view a Slutsky perturbation as a triple ˙ S, ˙ m, ˙ c. We identify Slutsky perturbations, without reference to
the inversion deﬁning them, in terms of independent linear constraints on ∇ :
on ˙ S ρ0 ˙ S =0 and ˙ S is symmetric
on ˙ m ρ0 ˙ m =0 and ˙ mxW0 =0
on ˙ c ˙ cW0 =0 and ˙ c is symmetric
(constraints)
9It turns out that m = Dwd.
8Theorem 5 (Identiﬁcation of Slutsky perturbations, Turner 2003a) Given u smooth in Debreu’s
sense and b in B0 with t =0 , consider the Slutsky matrices H(D2u)−1. Every small enough Slutsky
perturbation ∇ satisﬁes (constraints). Conversely, every small enough perturbation ∇ that satisﬁes
(constraints) is Slutsky: H(D2u)−1 +∇ is the inverse of H(D) for some D that is negative deﬁnite and
symmetric.
We use only Slutsky perturbations with ˙ m, ˙ c =0 by choosing ˙ S as follows. A matrix ˙ S ∈
R(C−1)(S+1)+J×(C−1)(S+1)+J is extendable in a unique way to a matrix ˙ S ∈ RC
∗+J×C
∗+J satisfying
ρ0 ˙ S =0 ;w ec a l l ˙ S the extension of ˙ S. It is easy to verify that if ˙ S is symmetric, so is its extension. In
sum, any symmetric ˙ S deﬁnes a unique Slutsky perturbation with ˙ m, ˙ c =0 .
Now we turn to decompositions of ∆,∇ in terms of Slutsky matrices, which in turn make up the inverse
the Hessian H matrix.
5.2 Slutsky decomposition of the Reaction to prices
The relevance of Slutsky perturbations is that they allow us to perturb demand functions directly, while
preserving their neoclassical nature, without having to think about utility. This is because Slutsky matrices




+ − mh · ([xh]0 : yh
0) (dec)
Here Lh





















mh = Dwhdh, and ([xh]0 : yh






















s ps)s as [eh]0p,w eh a v e Dp,q[eh]0p =( [ eh]0 :0 ) ,s of r o m( 2 )w eh a v e
∇ = ΣDp,qd
h + Dwhd





h · ([xh − eh]0 : yh
0)





h · zh0 (∇)
10Gottardi and Hens (1999) have this in the case C =1 .T h e yd on o ta d d r e s so rd e ﬁne Slutsky perturbations.
11We view p as one long vector, state by state, and p,q as an even longer one; (∗ :# ) denotes concatenation of ∗,#.
9This decomposition of the aggregate demand of (a,e,t,t∗) ∈ Ω generalizes Balasko 3.5.1 (1988) to
incomplete markets.
One implication of the decomposition is that ∇ is independent of the policy.
Proof that Mean Externality of Price Adjustment on Welfare is Regular. See Turner (2003b).
5.3 Slutsky decomposition of the Reaction to insurance









− mh · yh
1
Here Λh




1IJ : ... : λsIJ]J×JS
and yh
























j is column (C − 1)(S +1 ) +j of S
h.
5.4 Preparation for genericity
We investigate for each policy the Full Reaction of Demand to Policy and the Suﬃcient Independence of
Reactions. In computing
∆ ≡ Dada,e
we use the following notation for S













We can perturb Ph arbitrarily and get a Slutsky perturbation.
Remark 1 In checking the Suﬃcient Independence of Reactions, all marginal utilities λ
i and excess de-
mands z are automatically ﬁxed by the ˙ S
h
Slutsky perturbations. Their only eﬀect is on the Jacobian
˙ ∇ = Σ ˙ S
h
Lh
+ in (∇). Also, we solve ˜ k0 ˙ ∇ = β
0 piecemeal, solving ˜ k0 ˙ ∇p = β
0








q), ˙ ∇ =[˙ ∇p : ˙ ∇q].
12We view a as one long vector, state by state.
106 Pareto improving innovation in an existing asset
Here we prove the generic existence of Pareto improving innovation in an existing asset, targeting the income
eﬀect, by showing this policy passes the sensitivity test in theorem 4. Key is the generic position of
6.1 The insurance deﬁcit








= uh + c ∈ a⊥ ⊕ span(a)






Lemma 3 (Insurance deﬁcit in general position) If S − J ≥ H then generically in endowments, at
every GEI every H rows of the insurance deﬁcit U are linearly independent.14
Proof. Fix K ⊂ {1,...,S} with cardinality H, and apply transversality to




where πS\K =0 . Endowments make this transverse to zero. The burden of the argument is to control the









via appropriate ˙ λ
h
, i.e. ˙ λ
h
must preserve ﬁrst order conditions ˙ λ
h
0q = a˙ λ
h
1.A n y ˙ λ
h
is implementable by
an endowment perturbation ˙ eh = ˙ xh as we show last. If ˙ λ
h
0 =0 and 0=a˙ λ
h





























































So set ˙ λ
h
0 =0 and seek ˙ λ
h







= th.T oﬁnd ˙ λ
h








πs , ˙ λ
h





= th regardless of ˙ λ
h
S\K.H a v i n gs e t
˙ λ
h
K, deﬁne ˙ λ
h
S\K as a solution to 0=a˙ λ
h
1 = aK ˙ λ
h
K +aS\K ˙ λ
h
S\K, which exists since these are J equations
in |S\K| = S − H ≥ J variables and every J columns of a are linearly independent.
To implement this ˙ λ
h
,s o l v e D2uh · ˙ xh =( ps˙ λ
h
s)s for ˙ xh, possible by the negative deﬁniteness of D2uh
and the inverse function theorem. Implement this ˙ xh by setting ˙ eh = ˙ xh, while preserving the other
equations.
13This is the same as the decomposition λh
1 ∈ a⊥
+ ⊕ span(a+) by deﬁnition of new unwanted asset.
14This requires that every J columns of a are linearly independent.
11By the transversality theorem, generically in endowments, the system is transverse to zero in the re-
maining variables. These are dimp +d i mq +d i mπ variables and dimp +d i mq + H +1 equations, with
dimπ = H, so the associated zero set is a submanifold of dimension −1, hence empty. For these endowments
EK,t h e K rows of U are linearly independent. The intersection of the generic EK over the ﬁnitely
many such K is generic still.
6.2 Applying the sensitivity test
Substitution free innovation in an existing asset satisﬁes λ
h0
1 ˙ aj =0 . We parameterize ﬁnancial innovation
by T(b)=span(a,U)⊥. Note, ˙ aj ∈ T(b) ⇒ λ
h0
1 ˙ aj =0 .
Substitution free innovation provokes only the income eﬀect on demand; formula (Dajd) implies







Corollary 6 Fix the desired welfare impact ˙ v ∈ RH. Assume S − J ≥ 2H;H,C > 1. Then generically in
utilities and endowments, at every GEI ˙ v is the welfare impact of some ˙ t ∈ T. Hence there is a nearby
Pareto superior GEI with substitution free innovation in an existing asset.
Proof. The next lemmas with gendim = S−J −H and the hypothesis S−J −H ≥ H enable theorem
4.
Lemma 4 (Generic Dimension of Innovation) If S − J ≥ H,t h e n gendim = S − J − H. That
is, generically in endowments, at every GEI the vector subspace ˙ t ∈ T = T(b) parameterizing ﬁnancial
innovation has dimension S − J − H.
Proof. Lemma 3 says that generically in endowments U has rank H,a n dt h e n span(a,U)0s dimension
is J + H.
Lemma 5 (Full Reaction of Demand to Policy) If C>1,S−J ≥ H>1, generically in utilities and
endowments, at every GEI ∆ has rank gendim.
Proof. We recall ∆ = −Σmh
1 · yh
j has domain k ∈ T(b)=span(a,U)⊥, and take for granted the very
standard result that with H>1 generically in numeraire endowments, at every GEI asset j is traded.
Taking generic endowments from this result and the previous lemma’s, we apply transversality to









S×S selects from mh
1 ∈ RS(C−1)×S only the rows of commodities (s1)s≥1. Utilities make this
transverse to zero. The burden of the argument is to control the middle equations independently of the









ks, and no other. There is h∗ with yh∗
j 6=0 . From the identiﬁcation of
Slutsky perturbations 5, we may perturb arbitrarily any row of mh
∗




x W0 =0 ,w h e r e W =[ −q : a]. So perturb it as ˙ ∇
h∗
s =[ 0: as
yh
j


















k = as(k0k)=as is arbitrary. Indeed, ˙ ∇
h
∗
s W0 =0 since k ∈ T(b) ≡ span(a,U)⊥ ⊂ a⊥.
By the transversality theorem, generically in endowments and utilities, this system is transverse to zero in
the remaining endogenous variables. These number dimp+dimq+gendim and there are dimp+dimq+S
equations, and gendim = S − J − H, so by the preimage theorem, for these endowments and utilities the
associated solution set is empty—every GEI has Σ∇
h ·yh
j (a fortiori ∆) with linearly independent columns.
Lemma 6 (Suﬃcient Independence of Reactions) Generically in endowments and utilities, whenever
˜ k ∈ R(S+1)(C−1)+J is nonzero everywhere and β ∈ R(S+1)(C−1)+J, at every GEI there is a path of risk
aversion that solves ˙ ∆ =0 ,˜ k0 ˙ ∇ = β
0.
Proof. Fix such a ˜ k, and follow remark 1. Since ∆ = −Σmh
1 · yh
j is independent of the substitution
matrices S
h, which is all we perturb, automatically ˙ ∆ =0 and ˙ ∇ = Σ ˙ S
h
Lh





0,w es e t ˙ S
h6=H






¢−1 ≡ ˜ β
0
. This is made trivial by a
diagonal hence symmetric ˙ S
H





7 The insurance deﬁcit bound on the rate of improvement
We bound the rate of Pareto improvement by the equilibrium’s insurance deﬁcit, which vanishes exactly
at Pareto optimality. The bound turns out to be the covariance of the insurance deﬁcit with the marginal
purchasing power.
Recall that the welfare impact is ˙ vh = λ
h0dmh where dmh is marginal purchasing power, for some
matrices Σdmh =0 . (dmh = y1 − zdP.) Converting marginal welfare from utils to the numeraire at time
0, marginal utility becomes λh
λh
0
,w h i c hw er e w r i t ea s λ
h with λ
h





h0dmh the mean welfare impact




h + c ∈ a⊥ ⊕ a
by the ﬁrst order condition, being unique only in its insurance deﬁcit δ
h.I ft h emean insurance deﬁcit
is δ = H−1Σδ
h, then the GEI’s insurance deﬁcit is
∆ =[ δ
1 − δ : ... : δ
H − δ]S×H
13Note that the GEI is Pareto optimal exactly when ∆ =0 15. Computing the mean welfare impact,





















= H · cov(∆,dm 1)
since Σdmh =0 .T h erate of Pareto improvement is the norm of the functional dW |dv≥0 .
Remark 2 At a regular GEI, the mean welfare impact equals the covariance across households of the insur-
ance deﬁcit and the marginal purchasing power, dW = cov(∆,dm 1). So the rate of Pareto improvement is
bounded above by the norm of this covariance.
If the tax policy targets only current income, i.e. τh




T h es o l ec o n t r o li st h ef u t u r ep r i c ea d j u s t m e n t ,s i n c et h eG E Is e t st h ei n s u r a n c ed e ﬁcit and net trade. In
a nutshell, the mean welfare impact of the sole control is minus the covariance of insurance deﬁcit and net
trade.
8A p p e n d i x
8.1 Notation
An underbar connotes the omission of the sC,s ≥ 0 coordinates, as in xh; an upperbar on a price p
connotes the addition of sC coordinates with value psC =1 ,s≥ 0.













































8.2 Derivation of formula for welfare impact
It is standard how Debreu’s smooth preferences, linear constraints, and the implicit function theorem imply
the smoothness of neoclassical demand. It is standard also that the envelope property follows from the value
function’s local smoothness, which is the case for vh as the composition of smooth functions:
Dbvh = DbL(x,y,λ
h) |(xh,yh)(b)
15Also, a household’s commodity demand is as though asset markets were complete exactly when δh =0 .
14where b =( p,q,a,wh) and
L(x,y,λ
h) ≡ uh(x) − λ
h0
Ã
































So much for demand theory. Recalling regular GEI from the subsection on the Expression for the Price
Adjustment, dP 0 =( dp0,dq0) exists and
wh =[ p]0eh ⇒
dwh =[ eh]0dp
=( [ eh]0 :0 ) dP
Thus the welfare impact at a regular GEI is






















where zh0 ≡ ([xh − eh]0 : yh












































dv =( λ)0 (y1 − zdP)
To visualize the bracket notation [·] deﬁned in footnote 7, it staggers state contingent vectors:
[p] ≡
⎡












Af u n c t i o n F : M ×Π → N deﬁnes another one Fπ : M → N by Fπ(m)=F(m,π). Given a point 0 ∈ N
consider the ”equilibrium set” E = F−1(0) and the natural projection E → Π,(m,π) 7→ π. A function is
proper if it pulls back sequentially compact sets to sequentially compact sets.
Remark 3 (Transversality) Suppose F is a smooth function between ﬁnite dimensional smooth mani-
folds. If 0 is a regular value of F,t h e ni ti sar e g u l a rv a l u eo f Fπ for almost every π ∈ Π. The set of
such π is open if in addition the natural projection is proper.
As u b s e to f Π is generic if its complement is closed and has measure zero. Write C∗ = C(S +1). Here
the set of parameters is
Π = O × O0 × (0,²)
where O,O0 are an open neighborhoods of zero in RC
∗H,R
C∗(C∗+1)
2 H relating to endowments and symmetric
perturbations of the Hessian of utilities. We have in mind a ﬁxed assignment of utilities, which we perturb
by O0 × (0,²).S p e c i ﬁcally, given an equilibrium commodity demand x by some household and ¤ ∈
R
C∗(C∗+1)




(x − x)0¤(x − x)
where ωα : R → R is a smooth bump function, ωα |(− α
2 , α
2 )≡ 1 and ωα |R\(−α,α)≡ 0.I nan e i g h b o r h o o d




(x − x)0¤(x − x)
Du¤,α(x)=Du(x)+( x − x)0¤ ⇒ Du¤,α(x)=Du(x)
D2u¤,α(x)=D2u(x)+¤
So in an α-neighborhood the Hessian changes, by ¤, but the gradient, demand do not. For small enough
α,¤ this utility remains in Debreu’s setting, so neoclassical demand is deﬁned and smooth when active.
In the Suﬃcient Independence of Reactions, the path of risk aversions is identiﬁed with a linear path
(¤h,αh)(ξ) ≡ (¤hξ, kxhk
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